Nearly serial sharing methods
نویسنده
چکیده
A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in the input pro le. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input, not all of them should receive a bigger share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial. JEL classi cation numbers: C71, D63.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 37 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008