The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting: Why the Hastert Rule Leads to Defeat
نویسنده
چکیده
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science & Geography at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science & Geography Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Repository Citation Richman, Jesse, "The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting: Why the Hastert Rule Leads to Defeat" (2015). Political Science & Geography Faculty Publications. 5. http://digitalcommons.odu.edu/politicalscience_geography_pubs/5
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