On the Coalitional Rationality of the Banzhaf Value and Other Non-Efficient Semivalues
نویسندگان
چکیده
In the Inverse Set relative to a Semivalue, we are looking for a new game for which the Semivalue of the original game is coalitional rational. The problem is solved by means of the Power Game of the given game. The procedures of building the new game, as well as the case of the Banzhaf Value are illustrated by means of some examples.
منابع مشابه
Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues extend the notion of binomial semivalue to games with a coalition structure, in such a way that they generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. By considering the property of balanced contributions within unions, two axiomatic characterizations for each one of these values are provided.
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