The credit economy and the economic rationality of science

Philosophical discussions of the rationality of science have focused almost entirely on belief. The traditional model supposes that there is a set of theories a scientist considers live alternatives and the scientist has access to some evidence which (potentially, at least) relates to some of those theories. Philosophers then ask, what are rational constraints on how a scientist changes her mind in light of the evidence she has? The answer to this question can be put to use in explicating the scientific method, usually through concepts like confirmation and explanation. Or, it might be used in historical discussions to determine the degree to which scientific change was the result of “rational” considerations or instead the result of irrational ones. Someone trained in the theories of economic rationality due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), Savage (1954), and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) might find this way of discussing rationality odd. In the economic tradition, rationality is determined by the consistency of someone’s actions – or, perhaps, the consistency of their preferences over actions. Very little in the philosophical literature on scientific rationality is said about actions, except insofar as “believing theory t to degree p” can be thought of as an action. The philosophical focus on beliefs makes some sense. While in economic transactions, people are constantly taking very concrete actions – buying something, investing in a business, etc. – in science much of what goes on is more intellectual. On the other hand, the philosophical focus on beliefs has obscured the fact that scientists lives are filled with concrete decisions as well. Scientists must decide what projects to work on, how much time to dedicate to certain projects, how to pursue those projects, what to publish