Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
نویسنده
چکیده
We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) [27]. It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium – satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property – does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of dynamic equilibrium processes are also identified. It is shown that they always constitute a subset of the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994) [11]. A procedure that identifies a dynamic equilibrium process of coalition formation in finite time is constructed. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; C72; C78
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 146 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011