Non-bizarre delusions as strategic deception
نویسنده
چکیده
Thomas Szasz argued that mental illnesses are (often deceptive) social strategies. Using concepts from evolutionary biology, I investigate whether non-bizarre delusions might be a form of strategic deception. Non-bizarre delusions comprise a small number of themes, including grandiose, paranoid, and somatic. If, hypothetically, delusions were believed by friends and family members, delusional individuals would likely receive important benefits, such as increased social status and respect (in the case of grandiose delusions), increased protection (in the case of paranoid delusions), or increased care and assistance (in the case of somatic delusions). There is considerable evidence that severe social problems are an important cause of non-bizarre delusions. Moreover, in many cultures and sub-cultures, delusional individuals are believed by friends and family members and, hence, receive many benefits. The possibility therefore exists that delusions evolved to mitigate the dangerous consequences of social failure by serving to unconsciously deceive others into providing social benefits that otherwise would not be forthcoming.
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Delusions as exploitative deception
Non-bizarre delusions are hypothesized to be psychological adaptations which evolved to mitigate the dangerous consequences of social failure. When humans lived in small, kin-based groups, delusions would have functioned to combat social failure by closely mimicking conditions, such as possession of important information, external threats, or illness, where fellow group members were likely to c...
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