The effect of matching mechanism on learning in repeated 2x2 games with limited information

We conduct an experiment in which human subjects repeatedly play each of six 2x2 games under one of two matching mechanisms. Under fixed–pairs matching, each subject is matched to the same opponent in all rounds of a game. Under random matching, each subject is equally likely to be matched to each potential opponent in any round. In both treatments, the games are played under limited information: subjects are never shown the payoff matrices for the games they are playing, nor are they given information about opponent payoffs. We find that subject behavior, while similar in early rounds in the two treatments, diverges over time. By and large, outcomes are better under fixed–pairs matching than under random matching: coordination on a pure–strategy Nash equilibrium is more likely, and payoffs are higher. Convergence toward equilibrium play is faster under fixed pairs than under random matching in all games except Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal of Economic Literature classifications: D83, C72, C73.