Grounding the self in action G €

Consciousness and cognition are phenomena that seem to be inextricably bound to an individual first-person perspective: at least in standard situations, there is not only conscious experience, but also an experiencing self. And there is not only thought as such, but a thinking self as well. Why is there not only the flow of experience, but also someone—someone who has these experiences? And why do most thoughts not just occur in a free-floating way, like clouds in the sky, but seem to originate from—and within—a thinking self, a self somehow mentally portrayed as an independent cause in itself, a cognitive agent? Presently, in a number of different disciplines, two general answers seem to slowly emerge. First, the subject of consciousness and the subject of thought are frequently present in the unfolding process of phenomenal experience and cognition. They are present in the form and content of a self-representation, i.e., a representation of the experiencing, thinking system as a whole, which can be more or less explicit, more or less accessible to introspection, and more or less conscious. This self-representation is central to any understanding of the deep structure of mind. Second, the theoretically most relevant aspect of phenomenal and cognitive self-representation is likely to be found in the aspect of agency. It has to do with action control. The experience of agency is of maximal importance in constituting a first-person perspective as well as in the development of empathy and social cognition. This is so, because selfhood is not only characterized by phenomenal and representational properties, but also by highly specific functional properties—properties that somehow turn biological organisms into agents, sometimes even into persons. In order to fully understand these functional properties we need to know more about how they are implemented: neurobiologically, behaviorally, and socially. And we need a truly