Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities
نویسنده
چکیده
Using lattice-theoretical methods, we analyze the existence and order structure of Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games where payoffs satisfy certain monotonicity properties (which are directly related to strategic complementarities) but need not be quasiconcave. In games with strategic complementarities the equilibrium set is always non-empty and has an order structure which ranges from the existence of a minimum and a maximum element to being a complete lattice. Some stability properties of equilibria are also pointed out.
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