Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of Principle

Most critics of species egalitarianism point to its counter-intuitive implications in particular cases. But this argumentative strategy is vulnerable to the response that our intuitions should give way in the face of arguments showing that species egalitarianism is required by our deepest, most fundamental moral principles. In this article, I develop an argument against deontological versions of species egalitarianism on its own terms. Appealing to the fundamental moral ideal of proportionality, I show that deontological species egalitarianism is morally objectionable as a matter of principle: it is committed to treating two individuals who are extraordinarily similar in morally relevant respects drastically differently. I then illustrate how an inegalitarian account of moral standing might be incorporated into traditional moral theories in ways that make them far more promising as theories of our obligations to the non-human world. A central debate within the philosophy of moral standing has reached an impasse. Several influential pioneers of extending the domain of moral standing to include non-humans – philosophers such as Tom Regan and Paul Taylor – argue that, as a matter of principle, any individual that possesses moral standing must possess it equally. Failing to recognize this, they claim, is to run afoul of principles at the very heart of morality itself. But many others have pointed out that their egalitarian theories have practical implications that are so radical as to be wildly implausible. David Schmidtz, for instance, objects to Paul Taylor’s egalitarianism in this way when he points out that, “Vegetarians typically think it is worse to kill a cow than a carrot. Are they wrong? Yes they are, according to species egalitarianism. In this respect, species egalitarianism cannot be right.” Similarly, Mary Anne Warren objects to Tom Regan’s egalitarianism in this vein when she notes that “it is difficult to deny the importance of not being forced to share one’s living quarters with large numbers of rodents” even though killing them is often the only way to be rid of them. For such objectors,