The Blocking Lemma and Group Strategy-Proofness in Many-to-Many Matchings
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper considers group strategy-proofness in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for a many-to-many matching model under quota-saturability condition and max-min preference criterion that is stranger than substitutability of preferences. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that the deferred acceptance mechanism is group strategy-proof for agents on the proposing side under max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. Neither the Blocking Lemma nor the group incentive compatibility can be guaranteed if the preference condition is weaker than max-min criterion.
منابع مشابه
The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that th...
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