Self-Control, Social Preferences and the E ect of Delayed Payments

We extend the dual-self model to include altruistic preferences. This explains (1) why people may have preferences for equality in the laboratory but not in the eld, (2) why intermediate donations may occur in dictator games, (3) why cognitive load and time pressure may increase giving, and (4) why people often avoid the ask from solicitors when they would have donated if avoiding was impossible. Also, our model predicts that (5) delaying payments to both parties in the dictator game decreases giving. We verify this prediction in two large-scale experiments: people give less when payo s are delayed. This version: February 17, 2016. First Version: January 19, 2014 (previously titled Altruism and self-control ). We thank Syed Nageeb Ali, Gary Charness, Tom Cunningham, Jon de Quidt, Gautam Rao, Josh Schwartzstein, Charlie Spenger, Jeremey Tobacman and Leeat Yariv for helpful conversations and comments. We are grateful to NSF Grants SES-08-51315 and SES-1258665, as well as the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation (Svenska Handelbankens Forskningsstiftelser), the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, and the John Templeton Foundation for nancial support. ∗Corresponding author: David K. Levine Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics Department of Economics, Harvard University Department of Economics, European University Institute and Washington University in St. Louis Department of Psychology, Department of Economics, and School of Management, Yale University