A Curious Commentary on a Book on Mirror Neurons and Other Tales of Scientific Misses-R

higher-level representations when we are thinking more abstractly. By any metric, my publication record shows that I am quite sympathetic to the idea that sensory and motor systems play a substantial role in what we have traditionally viewed as “higher cognition.” Some cognitive psychologists might even label me as an embodied cognition theorist for all the reasons noted above. But at the same time I have no interest in putting the theoretical cart in front of the data horse. If the motor system plays a role, for example along the lines that Kilner (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007), Arbib (Arbib, 2004), and I have suggested, then it plays a role. I have no ideological objection to it. But the existing data, as reviewed in my book, point to either no role or a very small role indeed for the motor system in understanding actions. Glenberg suggests that the book is a “major miss” because it has clouded the contributions of mirror neuron theory to our understanding of cognition and behavior. He’s partially right. My book has clouded the contributions of the theory, but this is only because the theory is cloudy. The Myth of Mirror Neurons reveals this state of affairs and offers some alternatives for emerging from the mist. Acknowledgements: I am indebted to Giacomo Rizzolatti, Corrado Sinigaglia, and Art Glenberg for taking the time to provide their thoughts on my book and to Dom Massaro for organizing and editing the discussion and providing helpful feedback on my response. Supported in part by NIH DC03681.