Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to industrial organization
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization: oligopoly pricing, comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two-stage games. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; L13
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