Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine contemporaneous perfect ε-equilibria, in which a player’s actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within ε of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner’s ex ante perfect ε-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect ε-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria. 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C72; C73
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 53 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005