IRIS - A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks

Security is a concern of major importance to governments and companies throughout the world. With limited resources, complete coverage of potential points of attack is not possible. Deterministic allocation of available law enforcement agents introduces predictable vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries. Strategic randomization is a game theoretic alternative that we implement in Intelligent Randomization In Scheduling (IRIS) system, a software scheduling assistant for the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) that provide law enforcement aboard U.S. commercial flights. In IRIS, we model the problem as a Stackelberg game, with FAMS as leaders that commit to a flight coverage schedule and terrorists as followers that attempt to attack a flight. The FAMS domain presents three challenges unique to transportation network security that we address in the implementation of IRIS. First, with tens of thousands of commercial flights per day, the size of the Stackelberg game we need to solve is tremendous. We use ERASERC, the fastest known algorithm for solving this class of Stackelberg games. Second, creating the game itself becomes a challenge due to number of payoffs we must enter for these large games. To address this, we create an attribute-based preference elicitation system to determine reward values. Third, the complex scheduling constraints in transportation networks make it computationally prohibitive to model the game by explicitly modeling all combinations of valid schedules. Instead, we model the leader’s strategy space by incorporating a representation of the underlying scheduling constraints. The scheduling assistant has been delivered to the FAMS and is currently undergoing testing and review for possible incorporation into their scheduling practices. In this paper, we discuss the design choices and challenges encountered during the implementation of IRIS.