Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong, and then test bidders’ preference for first— vs. second—price auctions. JEL classification: D44, C91
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