Envy - Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. We are grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation under grant SES-9986190. We thank Andy Postlewaite for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125, USA. Email: [email protected] Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305, USA. Email: [email protected]
منابع مشابه
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Envy-freeness and Implementation in Large Economies
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. JEL classi cation numbers: D78, D51, D71 Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies Matthew O. Jackson Ilan Kremer
متن کاملEnvy - Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies ∗ Matthew
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness condition is necessary for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. In settings where agents’ allocations can be made excludably, asymptotic envy-freeness is also sufficient for implementation, while in nonexcludable settings it is not sufficient. ∗We are grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation under gra...
متن کاملPseudomarkets with Priorities in Large Random Assignment Economies
I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a nite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the nal assignment. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I de ne a new concept of fairness, called no unjusti ...
متن کاملMeta-envy-free Cake-cutting and Pie-cutting Protocols
This paper discusses cake-cutting protocols when the cake is a heterogeneous good, represented by an interval on the real line. We propose a new desirable property, the meta-envy-freeness of cake-cutting, which has not been formally considered before. Meta-envy-free means there is no envy on role assignments, that is, no party wants to exchange his/her role in the protocol with the one of any o...
متن کاملGeneralizing Envy-Freeness toward Group of Agents
Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which ...
متن کامل