The ideal free distribution as an evolutionarily stable state in densitydependent population games

In classical games that have been applied to ecology, individual fitness is either density independent or population density is fixed. This article focuses on the habitat selection game where fitness depends on the population density that evolves over time. This model assumes that changes in animal distribution operate on a fast time scale when compared to demographic processes. Of particular interest is whether it is true, as one might expect, that resident phenotypes who use density-dependent optimal foraging strategies are evolutionarily stable with respect to invasions by mutant strategies. In fact, we show that evolutionary stability does not require that residents use the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) at every population density; rather it is the combined resident–mutant system that must be at an evolutionary stable state. That is, the separation of time scales assumption between behavioral and ecological processes does not imply that these processes are independent. When only consumer population dynamics in several habitats are considered (i.e. when resources do not undergo population dynamics), we show that the existence of optimal foragers forces the resident-mutant system to approach carrying capacity in each habitat even though the mutants do not die out. Thus, the ideal free distribution (IFD) for the single-species habitat selection game becomes an evolutionarily stable state that describes a mixture of resident and mutant phenotypes rather than a strategy adopted by all individuals in the system. Also discussed is how these results are affected when animal distribution and demographic processes act on the same time scale.