Peddling Influence through Well Informed Intermediaries∗
نویسنده
چکیده
A sender with private information often tries to influence the decisionmaker through well-informed intermediaries such as experts or critics. Both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased: the objective type passes on the most accurate information, while the biased type wants to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective. Although using one’s own information is a sign of objectivity, the biased intermediary selectively incorporates the sender’s information to push his agenda. The intermediary’s truth-telling incentives always decrease in those of the senders. Thus regulations and laws aimed at improving truth telling of the sender lead the intermediary to distort more, which may strictly lower the decisionmaker’s payoff. In contrast, the sender and the intermediary’s truth-telling incentives are strategic complements if they report simultaneously and independently. JEL classification: C70, D82, M31, M38
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