Non-malleability from Malleability: Simulation-Sound Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs and CCA2-Secure Encryption from Homomorphic Signatures

نویسندگان

  • Benoît Libert
  • Thomas Peters
  • Marc Joye
  • Moti Yung
چکیده

Verifiability is central to building protocols and systems with integrity. Initially, efficient methods employed the Fiat-Shamir heuristics. Since 2008, the Groth-Sahai techniques have been the most efficient in constructing non-interactive witness indistinguishable and zero-knowledge proofs for algebraic relations. For the important task of proving membership in linear subspaces, Jutla and Roy (Asiacrypt 2013) gave significantly more efficient proofs in the quasi-adaptive setting (QA-NIZK). For membership of the row space of a t× n matrix, their QA-NIZK proofs save O(2t) group elements compared to GrothSahai. Here, we give QA-NIZK proofs made of a constant number group elements – regardless of the number of equations or the number of variables – and additionally prove them unbounded simulationsound. Unlike previous unbounded simulation-sound Groth-Sahai-based proofs, our construction does not involve quadratic pairing product equations and does not rely on a chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption scheme. Instead, we build on structure-preserving signatures with homomorphic properties. We apply our methods to design new and improved CCA2-secure encryption schemes. In particular, we build the first efficient threshold CCA-secure keyed-homomorphic encryption scheme (i.e., where homomorphic operations can only be carried out using a dedicated evaluation key) with publicly verifiable ciphertexts.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive

دوره 2013  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013