Commentary: The Embodied Brain: Towards a Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

There is a tension between the embodied approach to cognition (e.g., Varela et al., 1991; Anderson, 2003; Wilson and Foglia, 2011; Myachykov et al., 2014) and the neurocentric way of thinking. It manifests in the research on mirror neurons (Caramazza et al., 2014), action language understanding (Meteyard et al., 2012), or decisionmaking (Kubanek and Snyder, 2015), to mention just a few examples. In spite of radically embodied approaches to neuroscience (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Favela, 2014), the integration of neuroscience and embodiment is still a challenging requirement (Haselager et al., 2008; van Dijk et al., 2008; Gallagher et al., 2013). Kiverstein and Miller’s (2015, further: K&M) new paper should be read in that context. My main concern is that K&M’s main argument begs the question. I would summarize it as follows: