Eviction threats and investment incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that the effect of eviction threats on unobservable investment effort can be positive. We demonstrate this apparently counter-intuitive result in a model of tenancy where investment by a tenant in the current period raises the chances of doing well in the next period, and therefore retaining the job in the period after next period. If the tenant earns rents, the landlord can partly substitute eviction threats for the crop share as an incentive device. This makes it more attractive for him to elicit investment effort. However, there is a direct negative effect of eviction threats on the tenant’s discount factor. We find conditions under which the former effect dominates and eviction threats can increase investment incentives. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D23; D82; O12; Q15
منابع مشابه
The Impact of Land Tenure Security on Housing Investment at Informal Settlements (The Case of Eslamabad Neighborhood, Tehran)
In recent years, tenure security has been one of the main objectives of improvement projects in urban poor settlements. Despite lots of international studies initiated in this field, it has received little attention in Iran. The main aim of this paper is to assess the influence of tenure security on the level of household investment in housing. Survey method is considered as the methodology ...
متن کاملReproductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses
Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the 'restraint' model), but this idea remains untested. Here, w...
متن کاملWhen punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees...
متن کاملForthcoming Games and Economic Behavior
People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees...
متن کاملDilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives
The government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer’s R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on...
متن کامل