The Stability and the Formation of Coalition Structures in Normal Form TU Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
More economists are interested in analyzing situations in which cooperative behavior within a coalition coexists with strategic behavior across the coalitions. The underlying equilibrium is defined as the hybrid solution with a distribution rule (HSDR), which could contribute to these studies to the same extent that Nash equilibrium does to strategic behavior. The paper also defines the stable coalition structure, which extends the ideas in Thrall and Lucas (1963), Shenoy (1979) and Hart and Kurz (1983) to normal form TU games. These extensions not only make earlier results applicable to oligopoly markets but also provide insights on the refinement of Nash equilibria. Sufficient conditions for the existence of HSDR are provided, and three models of endogenizing coalition structure are constructed (JEL#: C62, C71, C72).
منابع مشابه
Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options
We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient -value Casajus (2008, Games Econ Behav, forthcoming) for TU games with a coalition structure. This value can be viewed as the outcome of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the playersproblem of distributing their componentsworth where the Shapley payo¤s serve as threat point. We provide characterizations both for exogenous and ...
متن کاملStable Coalition Structures under Restricted coalitional changes
In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coaliti...
متن کاملOutside options, component efficiency, and stability
In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value. Journ...
متن کاملUnique stability in simple coalition formation games
We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures, when the value of a coalition to a member depends solely on the identity of the other members of the coalition. We give a complete characterization of collections of coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure at every preference profile when only admissible coalitions may form. An alternative characteri...
متن کاملA Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
متن کامل