Informative Cheap Talk in Elections

Why do political candidates who are largely office-motivated sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with those of their electorate? Can non-congruent statements convey any information to voters about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements? We develop a model of credible costless and non-binding communication in electoral campaigns about candidates’ policy orientation. The foundation is an endogenous voter preference for a politician who is known to be non-congruent over one whose congruence is sufficiently uncertain. This preference arises because uncertainty about an elected official’s policy orientation can generate large policymaking distortions due to politicians’ reputation or career concerns. We find that informative cheap talk in elections can either increase or decrease voter welfare relative to uninformative communication. The scope for welfare benefits increases in the strength of politicians’ reputation concerns. ∗We are grateful to Wiola Dziuda, Alex Frankel, Massimo Morelli, Salvatore Nunnari, Ken Shotts, Stephane Wolton, and various conference and seminar audiences for helpful comments. Teck Yong Tan and Enrico Zanardo provided excellent research assistance. Kartik gratefully acknowledges financial support from the NSF. †Department of Economics, Columbia University. Email: [email protected]. ‡Department of Economics, University of Chicago. Email: [email protected]. “I think the American people are looking at somebody running for office and they want to know what they believe . . . and do they really believe it.” — President George W. Bush