The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer

نویسندگان

  • Yeon-Koo Che
  • Ian L. Gale
چکیده

This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget-constrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly pricing is optimal. By contrast, the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, to require the buyer to disclose his budget, or to offer financing. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D42, D45, D89, L12. 2000 Academic Press

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 92  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000