Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 18 January 2016 Available online xxxx JEL classification: D63 D70
منابع مشابه
Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
We consider random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. When each agent receives one object, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. When each agent receives more than one object, we propose a generalized probabilistic serial mechanism that is ordinally efficient and envy-free but not weakly s...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 105 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017