Pairwise kidney exchange

In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely …rst step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be indi¤erent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor (unless there is a rare perfect match). In the present paper we show that, although the pairwise constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-e¢ cient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patientdonor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 preferences. This class of mechanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accomodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, as well as stochastic mechanisms that allow considerations of distributive justice to be addressed. We would like to thank Anna Bogomolnaia, Frank Delmonico, Hervé Moulin, Muriel Niederle, Susan Saidman, and Jen Stack for helpful comments and conversations. Sönmez gratefully acknowledges the research support of KoçBank via the KoçBank scholar program and Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the Young Scientist Award Program via grant TS/TÜBA-GEB· IP/2002-1-19, and Roth and Ünver acknowledge support from the NSF. Any errors are our own responsibility. yE-mail: [email protected]; address: Harvard University, Department of Economics, Cambridge, MA 02138 and Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163. zE-mail: [email protected]; address: Koç University, Department of Economics, College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, Sar¬yer, · Istanbul, 34450, Turkey. xE-mail: [email protected]; address: Koç University, Department of Economics, College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, Sar¬yer, · Istanbul, 34450, Turkey.