Mortgaging the future: The consequences of smallholders’ short-term successes in responding to the 1992 drought in southern Africa

Findings from a participatory study (with 936 households in 72 villages in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) of how smallholders responded to the 1992 drought, and how they were (arguably) largely responsible for preventing the drought developing into a famine, are summarised below under seven headings. These are followed by a summary of two particular implications these findings may have for policy and practice in other food crises, suggestions for revised objectives in relief operations, and a brief discussion of the extent to which previous food crises can provide lessons for succeeding crises. The 1992 drought in southern Africa: some features of household responses 1/ Most of the effective responses to the 1992 drought consisted of activities undertaken by those most affected by it, particularly women. 2/ While their many activities helped prevent starvation and destitution in the short term, these activities had several deleterious consequences for their livelihoods. 3/ One of three interacting factors contributing to these deleterious consequences was that, for many of the poor households studied, purchases comprised the largest source of staple food. Purchases generally increased relative to an 'average' year. Financing these increased purchases compromised the future livelihoods of poor households. 4/ Secondly, markets for both food and rural commodities (especially livestock) worked against poor households due to the interaction of several factors. 5/ Thirdly, earnings from various income sources (particularly water-dependent sources) generally decreased, especially among poor households. 6/ The 1992 drought affected nearly all aspects of rural livelihoods. It most obviously affected harvests, water sources and livestock, but it also triggered an interacting series of changes in markets, prices, expenditure and income patterns which were equally profound. 7/ Most drought relief/FFW programmes were characterised by a 'receipt ceiling.' Staple food received by the poorest drought-affected people through such programmes generally amounted to little more than around around 25% of average monthly per capita cereal requirements, often much less, due to the interaction of various factors. Some of these features are illustrated in the attached diagram. These findings have two particular sets of implications for interventions in food crises To the extent that the above findings apply to other food crises: 1/ Interventions during food crises should support and complement the activities of the poorest households. 2/ Particular emphasis should be placed on interventions which minimise reductions in the purchasing power of the poorest households during food crises. Such interventions include subsidies, fee waivers, livestock …