Legal Reasoning A Jurisprudential Model

In jurisprudence methodological shifts of practical significance have seldom or never happened overnight. The discussion concerning legal methods and legal reasoning has been a challenge primarily for legal philosophers and many legal movements basically mirror a theoretical development. Nor is it always an easy task to elucidate methodological aspects related to legal reasoning in works of jurisprudence. Contributions to the study of legal reasoning are often part of more general discussions on the nature of law. It is also noticeable that in comparison to studies devoted to the nature of law and related issues, studies focusing on legal reasoning are scarce.1 The relatively low interest in legal reasoning processes may perhaps be explained by the fact that this has been a less problematic aspect of legal theory. In a historical perspective it is plausible that the problem of, for example, justification of legal decisions and discussions about codifications have appeared as much more compelling issues. The fact that relatively few philosophers have devoted their efforts to legal reasoning processes is nevertheless surprising since all contributions to jurisprudence must include assumptions about legal reasoning.2 It should be stressed however that the scarcity of studies on legal reasoning is by no means all-embracing. Legal reasoning has been the object of numerous studies reflecting a variety of approaches. But although a number of important contributions have been submitted, it is not appropriate to claim that there exists