Equilibria on a Game with Discrete Variables
نویسندگان
چکیده
Equilibrium in Economics has been seldom addressed in a situation where some variables are discrete. This work introduces a problem related to lot-sizing with several players, and analyses some strategies which are likely to be found in real world games. An illustration with a simple example is presented, with concerns about the difficulty of the problem and computation possibilities.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1407.8394 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010