Buridan’s Solution to the Liar Paradox

Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e., to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence “What I am saying is false.” It has been argued that this solution is either 1) ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences (Read 2002 ), or else 2) weakens his theory of truth, making his “a logic without truth” (Klima 2008, Dutilh Novaes 2011 ). Against 1), I will argue that Buridan’s solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against 2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a “weakened” theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity.