Bourdieu's Relational Method in Theory and Practice

A key tenet of Bourdieu's project is his rejection of what he refers to as "substantialist" approaches to social science which he identifies with positivistic formal methodologies. In place of this, Bourdieu makes a compelling case for the use of a relational methodology in analyzing social life. His theorization of relationism is both sophisticated and far-reaching and it provides the foundation for many of his theoretical constructs. In spite of the richness of these theoretical formulations, however, Bourdieu's actual research practice tends to come up short, often reflecting the same sort of linear methodological presuppositions which he has otherwise so eloquently dismissed. Drawing upon an approach to relational analysis that takes inspiration from the American network analytic tradition, I seek to demonstrate in this paper how Bourdieu's research practices are far less relational than his theoretical statements would seem to suggest. I emphasize a close reading of two different elements of Bourdieu's work, his research on cultural capital and his work on the analysis of institutional fields. Bourdieu's Relational Method in Theory and Practice John W. Mohr Department of Sociology University of California, Santa Barbara One of Pierre Bourdieu's key meta-theoretical assertions is that sociologists should embrace a relational rather than a substantialist approach. A substantialist approach privileges things rather than relations and, as such, has a tendency to reify the social order and to embody a positivist orientation to social research. In contrast, Bourdieu holds up the ideal of a relational analysis. A key tenet of such an approach is that objects under investigation are seen in context. Their meaningfulness is determined not by the characteristic properties, attributes, or essences of the thing itself, but rather with reference to the field of objects, practices, or activities within which they are embedded. In this paper I argue that Bourdieu's conception of relational analysis is extremely important for three reasons: it emphasizes the interpretative character of institutional life, it relies on a structuralist method of interpretation, and it provides an empirical mechanism for linking the duality of culture and practice. I also argue that Bourdieu's theory is better than his practice. Specifically I look at the way in which he seeks to operationalize his conception of relational analysis and I argue that though his methods are in some respects quite well crafted (because they emphasize the significance of analyzing the duality of culture and practice) they are in other respects quite limited. This is because they are founded upon the methodological habitus of mainstream social science which imposes measurement practices that reflect what Andrew Abbott (198x) has described as a General Linear Reality. I argue that though a linear (dimensional) orientation has many useful purposes it may not be well suited to describing the kinds of relational processes that Bourdieu's theory of relational analysis brings to the fore. Instead, I suggest the use of a more topological model of space such as that developed by network theorists. At the end of the paper I offer some examples of what this might look like.