Computing Equilibria of N-Player Games with Arbitrary Accuracy

From a variant of Kuhn’s triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an epsilon-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces epsilon toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations. COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA OF N-PLAYER GAMES WITH ARBITRARY ACCURACY SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON Abstract. From a variant of Kuhn’s triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an ε-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces ε toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations. From a variant of Kuhn’s triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an ε-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces ε toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations.