Positional Scoring Rules for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
We define a family of rules for dividing m indivisible goods among agents, parameterized by a scoring vector and a social welfare aggregation function. We assume that agents’ preferences over sets of goods are additive, but that the input is ordinal: each agent simply ranks single goods. Similarly to positional scoring voting rules in voting, a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . ,sm) consists of m nonincreasing nonnegative weights, where si is the score of a good assigned to an agent who ranks it in position i. The global score of an allocation for an agent is the sum of the scores of the goods assigned to her. The social welfare of an allocation is the aggregation of the scores of all agents, for some aggregation function ? such as, typically, + or min. The rule associated with s and ? maps a profile of individual rankings over goods to (one of) the allocation(s) maximizing social welfare. After defining this family of rules and discussing some of their properties, we focus on the computation and approximation of winning allocations.
منابع مشابه
Axiomatic and Computational Aspects of Scoring Allocation Rules for Indivisible Goods
We define a family of rules for dividing m indivisible goods among agents, parameterized by a scoring vector and a social welfare aggregation function. We assume that agents’ preferences over sets of goods are additive, but that the input is ordinal: each agent simply ranks single goods. Similarly to (positional) scoring rules in voting, a scoring vector s= (s1, . . . ,sm) consists of m nonincr...
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