Minimum Support Size of the Defender’s Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium Strategies in Security Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Stackelberg security games have been applied to address challenges in security resource allocation of realworld infrastructure protection tasks. The key to such an application is to efficiently compute the defender’s optimal strategy in consideration of the attacker’s surveillance capability and best response. Experimental results show that the defender’s optimal strategy often uses only a small subset of pure strategies, as compared with the entire pure strategy set which can be exponentially large. A number of algorithms in the literature have already exploited this small support size observation. This paper analyzes a number of widely studied security games and provides bounds on the minimum support size of the defender’s Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) strategies in security games.
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