Hypergraphical Clustering Games of Mis-Coordination
نویسندگان
چکیده
The price of anarchy was introduced to measure the loss incurred by a society of agents who take actions in a decentralized manner instead of through a central authority. Hypergraph coloring has traditionally been studied in the context of a central designer who chooses colors. In this paper we study the price of anarchy when the choice of color is delegated to each of the vertices which are assumed self-interested.
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