Genuine and Indexical Relativism in Truth-Conditional Semantics?

In Zwei Arten von Relativismus , Max Kölbel wants to make a substantial distinction between two types of truth-relativism. According to Kölbel, indexical relativism detects hidden indexicality in certain statements (e.g. moral judgments). This leads indexical relativists to claim that the proposition expressed by such a statement is relative to a further parameter in the context of use (e.g. a moral code). Indexical relativism, then, denies that the truth-value of these propositions is relative. Genuine relativism, on the other hand, claims that the truth-value of certain propositions (e.g. propositions expressed by moral judgments) is relative to a further parameter in the circumstances of evaluation (e.g. a certain perspective or a code). In this paper, I want to show that Kölbel's distinction only can be made with regard to certain semantic assumptions. My claim is that if truth-conditional semantics is endorsed, the distinction collapses. The distinction, therefore, is without substance in at least one well-known semantic theory. The question, if it substantial or insubstantial in other semantic theories is not subject to consideration here.