An Improved Robust Fuzzy Extractor

We consider the problem of building robust fuzzy extractors, which allow two parties holding similar random variables W , W ′ to agree on a secret key R in the presence of an active adversary. Robust fuzzy extractors were defined by Dodis et al. in Crypto 2006 [6] to be noninteractive, i.e., only one message P , which can be modified by an unbounded adversary, can pass from one party to the other. This allows them to be used by a single party at different points in time (e.g., for key recovery or biometric authentication), but also presents an additional challenge: what if R is used, and thus possibly observed by the adversary, before the adversary has a chance to modify P . Fuzzy extractors secure against such a strong attack are called post-application robust. We construct a fuzzy extractor with post-application robustness that extracts a shared secret key of up to (2m−n)/2 bits (depending on error-tolerance and security parameters), where n is the bit-length and m is the entropy of W . The previously best known result, also of Dodis et al., [6] extracted up to (2m − n)/3 bits (depending on the same parameters).