Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the “virtual” revenue equivalence.
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