Computing Nash equilibria through computational intelligence methods
نویسندگان
چکیده
Nash equilibrium constitutes a central solution concept in game theory. The task of detecting the Nash equilibria of a finite strategic game remains a challenging problem up-to-date. This paper investigates the effectiveness of three computational intelligence techniques, namely, covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategies, particle swarm optimization, as well as, differential evolution, to computeNash equilibria of finite strategic games, as globalminima of a real-valued, nonnegative function. An issue of particular interest is to detect more than one Nash equilibria of a game. The performance of the considered computational intelligence methods on this problem is investigated using multistart and deflection. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. MSC: 91A99; 91A05; 91A06; 74P99
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