The "nuclearization" of biology is a threat to health and security.

Every technology, from fire to gunpowder to aviation, has been used by humans largely for good but also for harm. But the capabilities of an individual or group to do great harm have increased markedly in the past 50 years. In the mid-20th century, we developed nuclear weapons, but these have remained in the hands of nation-states because it would be extraordinarily difficult for even a technically competent group of individuals to gain access to the singular ingredients—highly enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium—and the technology to develop a nuclear weapon and thus cause incalculable harm and mass death. To date we have controlled the proliferation of nuclear weapons by safeguarding the rare elements needed to produce them and by carefully screening scientists and technicians for their physical and mental health. Today, only a few nation-states have the bomb, and there have been zero accidental or terrorist detonations. More recently, our understanding of biology and the means to utilize it have improved greatly. Indeed, we’ve seen a revolution in recombinant DNA technology, synthetic genomics, nanotechnology, and de novo synthesis of microbes, among many examples. These powerful tools and information are now found in secondary schools around the globe and in homes of do-it-yourself genetic engineers. Proliferation of the biotechnologies is essentially complete. In 1996, one ‘‘outlier biologist’’ attempted to acquire a common, but potentially lethal, pathogenic microbe from the American Type Culture Collection. In response, alarmed legislators called for an official list of ‘‘dangerous pathogens’’ and the registration of laboratories that exchanged those pathogens. As a result, in 1997, the ‘‘nuclear model’’ was applied to biology for the first time. Years later, a series of ‘‘anthrax letters’’ killed 5 individuals, frightened tens of thousands of people, and precipitated a significant degree of government and economic disorder, prompting scientists to increasingly engage in discussions of ‘‘dual-use biology’’—that is, biology that could be used for malevolent as well as benevolent purposes. Then, on July 28, 2008, a respected senior scientist at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, committed suicide just before the Department of Justice was to seek an indictment charging him with crimes having to do with the anthrax letters. Now, the U.S. government is once again looking to the nuclear model to further regulate biology. It is worth pausing to reflect whether this is a wise strategy, given the dichotomy between the nuclear and biological threats. The