Additional Master Secret Inputs for TLS
نویسنده
چکیده
This document describes a mechanism for using additional master secret inputs with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS). Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English.
منابع مشابه
Safely Exporting Keys from Secure Channels - On the Security of EAP-TLS and TLS Key Exporters
We investigate how to safely export additional cryptographic keys from secure channel protocols, modelled with the authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) security notion. For example, the EAP-TLS protocol uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake to output an additional shared secret which can be used for purposes outside of TLS, and the RFC 5705 standard specifies ...
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ''work in progress.'' To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the ''1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shad...
متن کاملInternet-draft Ari Medvinsky Transport Layer Security Working Group Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (tls)
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ''work in progress.'' To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the ''1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shad...
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In this paper we introduce a classification of existing approaches to increase the security of block cipher operation modes based on re-keying, putting the focus on so-called internal re-keying without master key — re-keying during each separate message processing with no additional keys required. For extending the GCM base mode we provide an internal re-keying technique called ACPKM. This tech...
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Flexibility is one of the main strengths of the TLS protocol. Clients and servers can negotiate cipher suites to meet specific security and administrative policies. However, to date, authentication in TLS is limited only to public key solutions. As a result, TLS does not fully support organizations with heterogeneous security deployments that include authentication systems based on symmetric cr...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- RFC
دوره 6358 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012