Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence
نویسنده
چکیده
An experiment, consisting of two 15-period runs with 5 = 5 games, was designed w Ž .x to test Stahl’s International Journal of Game Theory 28, 111]13
منابع مشابه
A review on symmetric games: theory, comparison and applications
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 32 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000