An integrated vulnerability-based detection/interception model for the protection of regional infrastructure from covert attack

The expanse of U.S. transportation systems has helped to facilitate persistent national economic growth, its ease of access and reliability vital to the plethora of users who utilize daily the established infrastructure. Recent events have shown cause for concern, however, as the vulnerability inherent in such transportation systems has been exploited by the calculated attacks of highly motivated individuals and groups who have used these networks to target the connected critical infrastructure and human populations. This paper introduces a modified shortest path network interdiction formulation for the placement on detection sensors within a geographic region of interest in lieu of direct placement (or interdiction) of network arcs to assess regional network vulnerability. An integrated interception team model uses these resource location results to allocate interception units on the network and analyze their effectiveness in responding to generated sensor alarms. The p-Median problem and hypercube spatial queuing model are adapted to locate units and assess interception performance respectively. A demonstrative case analysis is offered for the region of Lancaster – Palmdale, CA.