Central Bankers and Uncertainty
نویسنده
چکیده
For the majority of my professional life, I have had the good fortune to be simultaneously involved both as a participant in, and as an academic observer of, central banks. Today, and as is suitable for this occasion and audience, I shall be primarily emphasising my academic observations. Nevertheless, my study of central bank behaviour is inevitably informed and coloured by my previous years as a Bank official, and current position as an external member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), but my comments today are unauthorised, not necessarily representative of any of my colleagues or of other central bankers, independent and, I trust, reasonably objective—and where they are mistaken I have no one to blame but myself, except of course for the econometrics, where I have had help from the Bank staff.
منابع مشابه
Inflation forecast contracts
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers' remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contra...
متن کاملKlaus Liebscher : Challenges for the Eurosystem ’ s monetary policy
Central bankers are used to acting under uncertainty in fact, this is a major rationale for their existence. The Eurosystem i.e. the ECB and the euro area national central banks has undergone and, I believe, successfully passed a special test on “Monetary policy under uncertainty” in managing the transition to EMU and in conducting monetary policy during the first one and a half years of the eu...
متن کاملDissecting the brains of central bankers: the case of the ECB’s Governing Council members on reforms
Since 2009, European central bankers have supported some reforms, in order to draw roadmaps to get out of the euro debt crisis. This paper tests whether the educational and professional background of European central bankers matter for the type of reforms each of them advocated. Through a textual analysis of public speeches delivered by the European central bankers, we draw a cognitive map for ...
متن کامل“Rules Rather Than Discretion” After Twenty Five Years: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?
Kydland and Prescott first identified the inflationary bias that results when a central bank does not precommit to a monetary policy rule. Subsequent work, published over the past twenty five years, demonstrates that this inflationary bias can be minimized by appointing central bankers whose preferences or incentives differ systematically from those of society as a whole. Subsequent work also s...
متن کاملPaper Autonomy, Private Ambition: Theory and Evidence Linking Central Bankers’ Careers and Economic Performance
Central bankers’ careers are shown to influence inflation outcomes. I present two theories in which careers explain central bank behavior, develop them in a game theoretic model, and test them using a comprehensive new data set of central bankers’ career backgrounds which spans twenty rich democracies and half a century. Career experiences vary considerably over this sample, and not only mould ...
متن کامل