Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Di®erentiated Duopoly¤
نویسندگان
چکیده
The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically di®erentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a ̄xed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process. J.E.L. classi ̄cation: D21, D43, L13
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