Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
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چکیده
Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“ 2)hascountablyinfinitelymanymasspoints.Allprobabilityweightisconcentratedonthosemasspoints, whichhavethezerobidastheirsolepointofaccumulation.Withcontestantsrandomizingoveranon− convexset, thereisacostofbeinghalfhearted, whichisabsentfromboththelotterycontestandtheall−payauction.Numericalbiddistributionsaregenerallynegativelyskewedandexhibit, forsomeparametervalues, ahigherprobabilityofex− postoverdissipationthantheall − payauction. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-98474 Published Version Originally published at: Ewerhart, Christian (2015). Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests. Economic Theory, 60(1):59-71. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x Econ Theory DOI 10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x RESEARCH ARTICLE Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
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تاریخ انتشار 2014