Green Consumerism and Collective Action . Parkash CHANDER
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze the effect of collective action by green/environmentally aware consumers on ambient environmental quality and market equilibrium. We consider a model with two types of consumers who differ in their willingness-to-pay for a good available in two different environmental qualities, and two competing firms: one selling the good of high environmental quality and the other of low environmental quality. We show that collective action by green consumers reduces competition and leads to higher prices for the good of both qualities. Though it improves the ambient environmental quality, it may reduce the welfare of both types of consumers. JEL Classification Numbers: H23, Q20, L13.
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