School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools☆

نویسندگان

  • Esther Duflo
  • Pascaline Dupas
  • Michael Kremer
چکیده

☆ We thank Josh Angrist, Paul Glewwe, Alaka Holla, Vict Menezes-Filho, Karthik Muralidharan, and seminar par Harvard, UC Santa Barbara, the World Bank, Dartmouth C International Seminar for their helpful comments and di Ministry of Education, International Child Support Africa, a laboration. We thank Willa Friedman, Jessica Morgan, N Pouliquen and Paul Wang for their excellent research Grace Makana and her field team for collecting the data. the Government of the Netherlands for the funding (B Program (BNPP) grants 7135425 and 7135426) that ma search protocol was approved by the following IRBs: MIT ⁎ Corresponding author at: 579 Serra Mall, Stanford CA E-mail addresses: [email protected] (E. Duflo), pdu [email protected] (M. Kremer).

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تاریخ انتشار 2012